Book Review
A
Long Time Ago, In An Election Far, Far Away:
Down & Dirty, The Plot To Steal The Presidency
by Jake Tapper
(Little, Brown and Co., 2001)
The
Accidental President
by David A. Kaplan
(William Morrow & Co., 2001)
Supreme
Injustice
by Alan M. Dershowitz
(Oxford Univ. Press, 2001)
The
Vote: Bush, Gore & The Supreme Court
edited by Cass R. Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein
(Univ. Chicago Press, 2001)
Breaking
The Deadlock
by Richard A. Posner (Princeton Univ. Press, 2001)
reviewed by Richard A. Forsten,
Esquire
On the one hand, the 2000 presidential election
and the post-election trauma in Florida seems like it happened
a lifetime ago; on the other hand, two years doesn't seem like
a long time and Florida often seems like only yesterday. Such
is politics, where two years can be a short time but also a
political lifetime.
In the two short years since then, over twenty-five
books have been written about what happened. These works can
generally be classified into three or four broad categories.
First, there are the "behind the scenes" accounts
such as Down & Dirty, The Plot To Steal The Presidency
by Jake Tapper and The Accidental President, How 413 Lawyers,
9 Supreme Court Justices, And 5,963,110 Floridians (Give Or
Take A Few) Landed George W. Bush In The White House by
David A. Kaplan. Second, there are the diatribes and polemics
which simply condemn the Supreme Court for its decision in Bush
v. Gore as purely political and one of the worst Court decisions
of all time. Alan Dershowitz's Supreme Injustice, How The
High Court Hijacked Election 2000 falls into this second
category. Third, there are several books are made up of short
articles and essays by various law professors offering different
thoughts and ideas about the Supreme Court decision and the
mess in Florida, including The Vote: Bush, Gore & The
Supreme Court, edited by Cass R. Sunstein and Richard A.
Epstein. Finally, there is Richard Posner's book, Breaking
The Deadlock: The 2000 Election, The Constitution, And The Courts,
which I put in a category of its own. Unlike the other legal
works, Posner's book presents, for the most part, a fairly straightforward
and unbiased review of the legal issues and does the best job
of dispassionately analyzing all of the legal arguments and
strategies which culminated in the Supreme Court's decision.
Before discussing any of these books, though,
a word of caution. If you're a diehard Democrat who believes
the election was stolen from Al Gore, then it doesn't matter
what you read, you will always believe that. Conversely, if
you're a rock-solid Republican who believes the Democrats and
the Florida Supreme Court tried to cheat George W. Bush by changing
the rules after the election, it won't matter what you read
because you will always believe that. Partisan politics aside,
though, at least some of these accounts are entertaining or
otherwise make worthwhile reading. Both the "behind the
scenes" accounts and the legal analyses offer something
of interest.
If there is one concept which the "behind
the scenes" accounts convincingly demonstrate, it is this:
legal strategies and political strategies don't always mix well.
By this I mean that what might make sense as a legal strategy
won't necessarily play well as a political strategy. A lawyer
wants to win his case before the court. A politician (usually)
wants to win his case in the court of public opinion. The two
aims, though, will often call for opposite strategies. Perhaps
nothing more vividly demonstrates this than Al Gore's decision
regarding recounts. Initially, he sought recounts only in heavily
Democratic counties. This was a sound legal decision because
it maximized his chances of picking up as many votes as possible
while minimizing the chance for gains by his opponent. Yet from
a political view, the decision was much less sound. It appeared
as though Gore was trying to stack the deck in his favor, rather
than trying to act in a fair and evenhanded manner. Gore certainly
didn't do anything legally wrong, but it may not have been the
best political decision. The point is that the best legal decisions
aren't necessarily the best political decisions, and vice versa.
Time and again, in both Down & Dirty as well as The
Accidental President, this conflict is apparent.
Several other things are also apparent or are
otherwise memorable from the "behind the scenes" accounts.
First, there was a tremendous amount of activity on numerous
fronts happening throughout the state such that it is difficult
to keep track of everyone and everything that happened. The
pace was frenetic. Second, both books are written with a real
"you are there" feeling that often makes for riveting
reading. The election night tenseness, as both sides waited.
The drama as Al Gore rode in his limo to give his concession
speech, while his aides in trailing limos desperately tried
to get hold of him to stop the speech (cell phone use was so
heavy, that no one could get through by cell). Much in both
accounts holds the reader's interest as we are taken, literally,
behind the scenes and see and hear the major players reacting
to developments and making the decisions that shaped the Florida
recount and lawsuits. At times it is a roller coaster effect.
At one point, Al Gore wanted to hire Erin Brockovich (yes, that's
right, the same woman that Julia Roberts portrayed in the movie)
to help get stories from folks for lawsuits claiming denial
of voting rights. His advisors all stood silent, and the idea
was quickly forgotten. Although this is just one of the many
"behind the scenes" scenes, for some reason it sticks
with you as somewhat surreal.
Neither Down & Dirty nor The Accidental
President is particularly flattering with respect to either
candidate or their advisors, although I believe that both tend
to be more derogatory of the Bush camp. While both books are
critical of various decisions and tactics employed, and describe
many of the players as arrogant, only Bush is subject to out
and out derogatory comments such as Tapper's "I do, in
fact, picture Bush clutching his pilly, curled up in the fetal
position, holding on to his daddy's leg."
At the end of the day, though, one is struck with
the observation that by and large the Bush team made the better
tactical decisions than the Gore team and played its hand better.
Of course, Bush had a better hand to play - he was leading after
all - but one can't help but speculate how the Gore team might
have done if it had called for a statewide recount immediately,
or if it had allowed the initial vote certification to occur
on the original timetable set by the legislature, thereby allowing
more time for the contest phase of the election. Indeed, there
is a certain irony. The Gore team got the Florida Supreme Court
to extend the deadline for certifying the results, but at a
cost of greatly reducing the time for a contest. The Supreme
Court ultimately ended the recount over concerns about lack
of time to finish. If the contest phase had started 10 or 12
days sooner, there may very well have been time to complete
the recount.
But "behind the scenes" accounts of
Florida and Bush v. Gore are, of course, only part of
the story. There is the ultimate Supreme Court decision which
ended the matter, as well as the lower court decisions preceding
it. Neither book attempts a legal analysis, but Supreme Injustice,
by Dershowitz, The Vote, edited by Sunstein and Epstein,
and Breaking The Deadlock, by Posner, all provide varying
views of the Supreme Court decision and the lower court decisions.
Dershowitz, as the not-so-subtle title of his
book (Supreme Injustice) suggests, believes that the
Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore was wrong and
represents nothing more than the naked preferences of the five
majority justices. His book is entirely one-sided, vitriolic,
and mean-spirited. Indeed, it is so partisan and one-sided that
it detracts from the arguments Dershowitz makes. Moreover, his
relentless attack on the "five" justices who found
an equal protection violation completely ignores the fact that
seven (count'em) justices found an equal protection violation,
but that only five of the seven justices voted to end the recount,
with Stevens and Souter expressing their view that the Florida
Supreme Court should be afforded the opportunity to create uniform
standards and the recount should be allowed to continue. While
Dershowitz excoriates the "five" justices who found
an equal protection violation as acting contrary to past Supreme
Court decisions and contrary to their own previously expressed
views, he says nothing about Souter and Stevens, who also found
an equal protection violation. Dershowitz has written some good
books. This is not one of them.
A more balanced analysis can be found in The
Vote: Bush, Gore & The Supreme Court, which is a collection
of eleven short essays by various law professors and legal scholars
on the Bush v. Gore decision. Some of the essays are
critical, others more positive. They are wide-ranging in their
views and conclusions, but they all offer interesting thoughts
and ideas.
Of all the books written about Florida and Bush
v. Gore, however, Richard Posner's book, Breaking The
Deadlock: The 2000 Election, The Constitution, And The Courts,
is probably the best written in terms of style, substance and
balance. Posner reviews the vote totals as reported and demonstrates
that, based on statistical analysis, in all likelihood Gore
would have lost even if the Supreme Court had not halted the
recount. However, Posner also believes that more voters probably
intended to vote for Gore than Bush, although for a variety
of reasons they failed to cast proper ballots, meaning that
in his view Bush was the winner of the election because it's
proper ballots that count.
More importantly, though, Posner walks the reader
through the litigation in a way that makes sense and keeps things
clear. He believes the Florida Supreme Court repeatedly erred,
first by extending the certification date by twelve days, and
then by overturning the lower Florida court's holding rejecting
Gore's contest. He argues that the Supreme Court's ultimate
decision to reverse the Florida Supreme Court was the right
course for pragmatic reasons, although he believes that the
stronger ground for such a decision would have been that the
Florida court's actions violated Article II of the Constitution
(that the election be conducted in the manner directed by the
legislature) rather than the Equal Protection clause. Posner
defends his pragmatic justification based upon any number of
scenarios that could have played out had the Supreme Court not
stopped the counting (including a scenario under which Lawrence
Summers could have become acting president in January 2001,
while legal challenges continued). Yet, whether one agrees with
Posner's own ultimate conclusions or not, he has written a fair
and balanced review of the entire situation which is both thought
provoking and highly readable.
But what do any of these books or others ultimately
tell us about how history will judge Florida and Bush v.
Gore? In so many respects, it seems far too early to gauge
the ultimate impact of the Supreme Court's decision. If Bush
is re-elected and has a generally successful presidency, then
one suspects that the decision (while it will be subject to
continuing derision by some) will ultimately be treated as something
of a footnote and largely forgotten, particularly when compared
to cases such as Marbury v. Madison, Brown v. Board of Education,
or Roe v. Wade. However, if Bush's presidency is
generally perceived as unsuccessful and he is not re-elected,
then the decision will probably be remembered in a harsher light.
History, though, will have the advantage of judging with the
benefit of hindsight and reflection.
Return to November 2002
Table of Contents.